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Solidarity amongst member states, one of the European Union’s fundamental values, has 
recently been put to the test by numerous and diverse challenges that have led to a “crisis of 
solidarity”. In the UK, the decision in June 2016 by the electorate to vote to leave the 
European Union revealed the British dimension of this crisis. However, little is known about 
the perceptions of other European citizens on this decision, even though it has contributed 
towards shaping the present and future of the European Union. In this paper, using a 
representative survey conducted in eight European Countries including the UK, we aim to 
explore and contrast cross-country evidence on individual perceptions on Brexit. We then 
aim to establish if an association exists between opinions on Brexit and individual solidaristic 
attitudes and concrete behaviours of survey respondents. The complex relationship between 
opinions on this event and expressions of solidarity at different levels (local, national, 
European and beyond) will be explored using multivariate regression techniques as well as 
the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of survey respondents. 
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The decision by the British electorate for their country to leave the European Union has made 
the 23rd June 2016 an historic day for the EU and its citizens. The resistance of the UK in 
devolving its authority to supranational European institutions has however for some time led 
to the relationship between the UK and Europe being characterised as an ‘awkward’ one 
(Buller, 1995, 2000; Wilks, 1996; George, 1995, 1998). More broadly, the departure of a key-
economic, financial and political partner might suggest a failure in the capacity of the EU to 
maintain the cohesion of its members.  
Of course, the decision by the UK to leave the European Union can be understood through 
the prism of a range of factors. For example, those economic factors that have impacted a 
section of the population that has experienced labour market fragility and factors that shape 
the broader European context where fears over immigration have created opportunities for 
populist and reactionary political forces, movements and parties. Nevertheless, amidst the 
context of the UK leaving the EU we should also recognise that cohesion among member 
states was a key ingredient in the new, post-national, federalist polity that the founding 
fathers of what is today the European Union advocated for in the aftermath of the Second 
World War (Spinelli and Rossi, [1944] 2006) and underpinned the deepening and widening 
of the EU-making process (Nugent, 2017). This bi-dimensional path of European Union 
development, that is its widening borders (expanding the membership to new countries and 
peoples) and its deepening competences (through overtaking authority on new policy fields) 
was crucial for the Union’s aim to promote solidarity among states as provided for by its 
founding treaty (cfr. Art. 3 TEU). The vote in favour of Brexit (as the United Kingdom’s exit 
from the EU has been popularly labelled), thus presents a potentially seismic effect on this bi-
dimensional development of transnational solidarity. Nevertheless so far, most of the 
analyses of the (soon to become abundant) literature on Brexit has neglected solidarity, and 
has omitted investigation of the motivations for Brexit outside of the UK. Therefore, the 
insights offered by this paper could not be more relevant for contemporary political analysis 
and are intended to broaden the scope of the current literature on Brexit by illuminating those 
factors which catalyse hostility towards the European Union across different European 
contexts, while shedding light on the status of individual solidaristic attitudes and practices 
among the peoples that form the European demos. 
Although Brexit could be seen to represent a deep wound for the European project, it is 
surprising that most of the political science literature on Brexit has not shown much interest 
in discussing Brexit from a comparative perspective across Europe. Neither have scholars 
developed studies to examine whether the same dynamics that have driven a pro-Brexit 
decision among UK citizens are to be found among other European citizens/voters. In this 
paper we shall contribute towards closing this gap by focusing on the perception of Brexit 
across the European demos, and by discussing the types of attitudes and practices that 
connect European citizens. 
Just as the EU referendum in the UK was characterised by polarisation, our analysis of survey 
data across eight countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, 
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and the United Kingdom) confirms a similar degree of polarisation across European 
countries. Furthermore, our multivariate analysis reveals that the likelihood of a person to 
vote for Brexit depends on a very similar set of factors scholars have pointed to when seeking 
explanations for the pro-Brexit vote in the UK (Clarke et al, 2017). Essentially, pro-Brexiters 
share the same set of socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics across Europe: they 
are likely to be citizens with lower levels of education and less stable jobs, they fear 
immigrants, who are perceived as competitors in the labour market and challengers to their 
‘established’ (group and individual) identity. Therefore, they oppose the EU for its freedom 
of movement policies that are considered as opening the door to foreigners as intruders.  
However, our analysis also considers two additional aspects that were not included in earlier 
studies: the role that solidarity as altruistic behaviours and values play in the Brexit issue and 
the role of the economic context in determining the willingness of respondents to support 
Brexit or to oppose it. Thus, our findings offer a unique and empirically based analysis that 
builds upon a recognition in recent research that Brexit, although embedded within the 
idiosyncrasies of the British context, is reflective of a broader phenomenon, one of 
polarisation that can be identified across a Europe where there is a intensifying opposition 
between those who have benefitted from globalisation and those who feel it has left them 
behind (Kriesi et al, 2006, Hobolt, 2016). In fact, we argue that there is a salient segment of 
society, across a number of member states who perceive the European Union as a threat to 
their well-being rather than an asset. 
The paper unfolds as follows: we first introduce our hypotheses, we then discuss the data and 
methods, we illustrate the findings, and we then discuss the most salient implications of them. 
Finally, we present our concluding remarks.  
Hypotheses  
Given the watershed nature of the event, Brexit has attracted scholars’ attention and a 
growing literature is emerging that has scrutinized the reasons for the decision by the British 
people to vote to leave the European Union (Hobolt, 2016; Antonucci et al, 2017; Curtice, 
2017; Henderson et al, 2017; Hopkin, 2017; Thompson, 2017; Goodwin et al, 2018). The 
evidence thus far suggests that pro-Brexit voters have been motivated by a mixture of identity 
and utilitarian-based fears provoked by the cornerstone no-border policy of the EU. British 
people felt their identity was being threatened by the increased immigration which was a 
natural by-product of the free movement of people, one of the ‘four freedoms’ of the EU 
single market that sits alongside the freedoms of capital, goods and services. On the other 
hand, people in the UK felt that increased immigration not only represented a threat for their 
identity but also for their pocket, as immigrants would compete for their jobs. Hence, the 
literature points to fear of immigration and more clearly xenophobic attitudes as the most 
salient predictor of the Brexit vote, along with specific individual features that usually make 
people more exposed to fear of diversity than others (such as a lower level of education, or 
insecure employment) (McLaren, 2002; De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Goodwin and 
Milazzo, 2017; Vasilopoulou and Wagner, 2017). Furthermore, extant studies have shown 
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that those sections of society with a disposition of support towards European integration 
express a strong sense of attachment towards the European Union as a community and polity. 
We assume that similar patterns of perception vis-à-vis immigrants and the European Union 
will apply across Europe, and therefore we form our first hypothesis (H1) that respondents 
that will likely opt for Brexit will belong to those social classes that pay the highest costs of 
globalization (the so called ‘losers’ from globalization). Therefore those who fear the 
potential competition emanating from the opening up of countries and markets, usually 
people with lower educational resources and a precarious employment history, would likely 
support Brexit. Furthermore, we add the hypothesis (H2) that populations within countries 
with a poor economic outlook or whose country has suffered from the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis are more likely to support Brexit as they feel even more exposed to the risk of 
competition coming from immigrants and the open EU market. This macro-contextual 
economic uncertainty would increase their own perceived economic fragility. Hence, we shall 
control for the countries macro-economic outlook and form the further hypothesis (H3) that 
the weaker the macro-economic outlook, the stronger the likelihood of its citizens to support 
Brexit. Moreover, we add the hypothesis (H4) that people with a stronger sense of attachment 
to the EU will likely support the UK to stay in Europe. 
Finally, given the saliency that solidarity plays in sustaining the cohesion of the European 
union, we shall control for it and form the hypothesis (H5) that people that are engaged in 
any form of solidarity (either with their own country or with a wider focus) will likely be 
more inclusive and would not fear immigration. 
Data and Methodology 
We use data from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2016 for the Horizon 2020 
TransSOL (Transnational Solidarity at Times of Crisis) project which was undertaken in 
eight European countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland 
and United Kingdom). The survey, conducted by a survey organization, used demographic 
and geographical criteria to establish quota sampling methods (age, gender, education level 
and region). The unemployment rate, expressed as a percentage of the labour force, in 2016 is 
derived from the Labour market statistics of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The GDP growth as an annual percentage for 2016 is calculated in 
each country by the World Bank. Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics by country and 
Table A2 (see Appendix) provides further information on the variables. The final sample has 
11865 observations in total.  
The dependent variable, Brexit, is derived from responses to the survey question: ‘Should the 
UK remain a member or leave the EU?’ It is a binary variable and indicates if the individual 
supports the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The independent variables included in the 
model have been identified in the literature as relevant in shaping attitudes towards EU 
integration and division (see, for example, Hobolt, 2016 and Clarke et al., 2017). These are: 
(a) individual sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education, being born in the 
country, employment status, and occupation); (b) Political values and knowledge (left-right 
self-placement in the political scale, political interest, and political knowledge); (c) Attitudes 
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and practices: attachment to the EU, solidarity practices, and attitudes towards immigration. 
The three solidarity practice variables are binary and indicate if survey participants have 
supported, in the last 12 months, the rights of other people/groups in their own country, other 
EU countries or third countries/non-EU countries through various forms of political actions 
including more contentious as well as more conventional types: attendance at a march, protest 
or demonstration; donated money; donated time; bought or refused to buy products; passive 
(paycheck) membership; active membership (volunteering). The attitudes towards 
immigration were proxied by two variables. Firstly, individual responses to the question: 
‘Would you mind having immigrant foreign workers as neighbours?’  (Yes/No). Secondly, a 
ten-point bad-good scale on the perceived effect on the economy of the foreigners who had 
come to live in the country was used. These variables are described in detail in the Table A3 
(see Appendix). 
We estimate a logistic multilevel random effects model as the individual data have a 
hierarchical structure; the individuals are nested within eight different countries and, 
therefore, likely not to be independent within-country (intra-class correlation) due to 
macroeconomic factors. To further understand the importance of these contextual factors we 
include the GDP growth rate (model 5) and the national unemployment rate (model 6) as 
proxy indicators for the impact of the economic crisis in the different European countries 
(Grasso and Giugni, 2016). 
Findings  
We begin the findings’ section with descriptive analyses showing how the different countries 
score regarding the question of whether the UK should leave or remain in the EU, in other 
words, we consider how countries differ vis-à-vis Brexit. Table 1 shows that ‘pro-Brexiters’ 
largely outweigh ‘remainers’ in Switzerland, France and Greece, while in Poland, Germany, 
and Denmark the vast majority of respondents would have preferred the UK to stay in the 
EU. In Italy and in the UK respondents are split in two, with half supporting the UK 
remaining in the EU and the other supporting the decision to leave. This initial descriptive 
overview tells us that there are various shades of perception regarding Brexit across the eight 
countries but which can be identified as three possible clusters: one that is clearly in favour of 
the idea that the UK should leave the Union, another that is clearly opposed, and a third 
cluster made by the UK itself and Italy in which people are evenly split between the two 
scenarios.  
Table 1 shows also the percentage of respondents that have a strong or relatively strong 
attachment to the European Union. We have introduced this aspect because we believe that 
the perception of Brexit across Europe could also be understood by the sense of belonging 
that people have towards Europe: in other words, we assumed that people that supported 
Brexit would likely show a lack of interest or attachment to the European Union in general. 
In fact, Table 1 reveals a degree of consistency between those countries that host large 
Brexit-supporting respondents and those who host respondents with a low degree of 
attachment to Europe, such as Greece and Switzerland. However, the results in Table 1 unveil 
also an inconsistency with our assumption: France, whose respondents largely favoured 
 8 
Brexit, show indeed a strong attachment to Europe (one in every two respondents feels a 
strong attachment to Europe), and Denmark, where respondents preferred the UK to remain 
in the EU, reveal a lower level of attachment to the EU.  
Such a variety of positions in both the Brexit issue and the attachment to the EU as a political 
and social community, and the only partial consistency between them, provide some 
preliminary evidence encouraging our assumption that when looking for possible explanatory 
paths to Brexit one would need to consider not only individual (micro) variables, but also 
some context (macro) indicators. In fact, the varied positions in the countries vis-à-vis Brexit 
suggests that different contexts might lead to different perceptions of Brexit.  
In this sense, Table 1 also shows some possible directions for our explanatory analysis to 
unfold. Firstly, apart from Switzerland (the only non-EU member country in our sample, and 
where preferences for Brexit could be interpreted as a logical consequence of the decision of 
that country not to join the EU), the other two countries that are largely pro-Brexit are France 
and Greece which share some relevant characteristics (along with Italy, where voters are 
almost equally split in two). In fact, mutatis mutandis, these pro-Brexiter countries and the 
quasi-Brexiter Italy, have experienced a long-lasting political institutional deadlock provoked 
by economic stagnation (which, in the case of Greece, has reached a stage of quasi-
bankruptcy status), and, in the case of Greece and Italy, the suffering caused by 
uncontrollable international events such as the massive influx of refugees escaping Syria 
which have heavily impacted on the already strained public and private resources of the 
countries. While countries clearly favouring the UK to remain, that is Poland, Germany, and 
Denmark, did not experience anything similar to what Greece, France and Italy had to 
undergo: their economies did not suffer from the economic and financial crisis, hence, they 
benefited from cohesive societies and political-institutional stability. Therefore, we have 
developed an explanatory model controlling for macro-economic contextual dimensions. 
Table 1  
We now move to the findings from our explanatory analyses. To investigate the socio-
demographic characteristics, political attitudes and behaviours that determine preferences 
regarding Brexit, we estimate five different models which are shown in Table A4 (see 
Appendix). Firstly, we estimate an ‘empty’ model (model 1), which includes only a random 
intercept, to observe if a contextual dimension exists. After concluding that the 
macroeconomic context of the country is relevant, we then include the individual and 
country-level characteristics. Model 2 includes socio-demographic characteristics and in 
model 3 we add political values, interest and knowledge. Model 4 presents our results 
including our main variables of interest which are EU attachment, solidarity practices and 
attitudes towards immigration. Models 5 and 6 include different country-level variables to 
account for the economic context.  
 
Our findings are generally in line with the literature that has explored the determinants of 
individual preferences on Brexit using UK data (Clarke et al, 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 
2016). When considering socio-demographic variables, the association between age, having a 
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lower level of education, being unemployed and support for Brexit is positive and significant 
across models (2-6). On the contrary, being female significantly reduces the likelihood of 
having a preference for Brexit (models 2-6). Other determinants such as being a native of the 
country and having a manual occupation are, as anticipated, positively and significantly 
associated to support for Brexit (models 2 and 3) but both factors lose their significance when 
attachment to the EU, solidarity practices and especially, attitudes towards immigration are 
introduced into the model specification (models 4-6). In consonance with similar studies on 
preferences towards integration, individuals that place themselves at the right end of the 
political spectrum (models 3-6) and are both politically interested and savvy (models 4-6) are 
more likely to support the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. Similarly to other scholarly 
studies, individual attachment to the EU is one of the main factors that shape attitudes 
towards European integration (Hobolt, 2016). Models 4-6 show that individuals feeling 
attached to the EU are significantly less likely to support the UK leaving the EU.  
 
The connection between solidarity practices and attitudes towards European integration has 
not yet been explored in the literature and our results show (models 4-6) that solidarity 
practices towards disadvantaged groups are only significantly associated with Brexit 
preferences if these are undertaken within the country. Contrary to expectations, our results 
suggest that individuals who practice solidarity to support groups in their own country are 
more likely to support Brexit.  
 
Moreover, echoing the literature (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), the role of attitudes towards 
immigration as key predictors for supporting Brexit in the UK is also confirmed in models 4, 
5, and 6 across the eight European countries in our study. Our findings suggest that support 
for the UK leaving the EU is particular to a socially distinctive group and seems to be 
associated with an anti-immigration populist movement across Europe.  
 
Finally, when including the GDP growth rate for 2016 as a country-level variable in model 5, 
we observe a negative and significant effect of this macroeconomic variable on support for 
Brexit. This indicates that populations within countries that are in a better economic situation 
are less likely to support Brexit. Whilst the unemployment rate variable included in model 6 
has the positive expected sign, the association is not significant.  
 
Discussion 
When analysing our data what became clear across the different contexts of our study was 
that a favourable disposition towards voting for Brexit could be mapped on to the issue of 
immigration. The policy discourses surrounding the immigration in the UK have for some 
time been shaped by restriction and border control (Statham and Geddes, 2006; Squire, 2008; 
Mulvey, 2010) and more broadly capitalising on xenophobia and the fear of immigration has 
been a longstanding tactic of the radical right which in turn has been the subject of extant 
research for decades (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1997; Norris, 2005; Semyonov et 
al, 2006). Therefore, our findings on relating to immigration not only speak to this body of 
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work but contribute fresh empirical data and analysis that cuts across the recently re-
energised borders of Europe. Our findings indicate that immigration is a significant variable 
when understanding support from across Europe for the decision taken in the UK to leave the 
European Union. And solidarity, as action of support for country nationals, is positively 
correlated with a vote for Brexit. These findings are consistent across the countries of our 
study and they therefore broaden the scope of existing research into the causes of Brexit and 
are reflective of those studies conducted in the UK that highlight the importance of 
immigration in understanding the Brexit vote (Goodwin and Milazzo 2017).  
 
When we turn to the socio-demographic factors that influence support for Brexit, we can see 
that age, gender and education all have a clear impact on the decision of the UK to leave the 
European Union. Our findings suggest that age is an important factor and indeed extant 
research analysing the recent rise in support for right wing populist causes in the USA and 
Europe has suggested that support for policies, parties and issues that embody xenophobic 
and/or populist attitudes skew towards the older age range in society (Inglehart and Norris, 
2017). In the UK more specifically, recent analysis (Ford and Goodwin, 2017) has indicated 
that support for Brexit has at least part of its roots in a sentiment within that section of the 
UK population which rejects the changes that took place in society across the last few 
decades, resulting in older voters, many of whom are white, nationalist and conservative and 
who have chosen to articulate their rejection of the more socially liberal society in which they 
find themselves through a vote to leave the European Union. Therefore, our findings suggest 
that this generational schism may be apparent across different European contexts and given 
the right political conditions and opportunities could manifest itself in similar ways.   
 
Another socio-demographic factor that emerges from our findings is gender: across the 
countries of our study, those who support the decision to leave the European Union are 
predominantly male. This finding chimes with existing research that suggests support for the 
authoritarian or populist right trends to be concentrated among male voters (Lubbers et al, 
2002). Indeed there is a growing literature which attempts to explain the gender gap in the 
support for what are populist and xenophobic parties and positions ranging from socio-
economic explanations to explanations focused upon populist attitudes (Immerzeel et al, 
2015; Harteveld et al, 2015; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015, 2017). 
 
At the outset of this paper we outlined the broader context which forms the background to our 
survey, a United Kingdom specifically and a Europe more broadly that have been shaped by 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity policies which followed. However this 
contemporary economic context needs to be grounded in processes that precede the crash of 
2008, processes of globalisation (Scholte, 2005) that have transformed the industrial bases of 
various developed countries, have resulted in a major expansion of the global labour supply 
(Freeman, 2015) and has created both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Kriesi et al, 2006, 
Essletzbichler et al, 2018). What these conditions have contributed towards in some 
communities across Europe and beyond is a growing sense of insecurity regarding living 
standards, a reversal of fortune from the post-war decades of growth and security that many 
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had enjoyed and as a consequence what this produces is the type of support for anti-
immigration campaigns and xenophobia (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). 
In the analysis of our data we indeed found that poorer levels of growth in GDP were a 
contributing factor to increased levels of support for leaving the European Union, with those 
in favour of Brexit located within countries with the most sluggish growth. Moreover, in the 
course of our analysis we observed that the findings from Greece were at the forefront of this 
support and thus chime with and also contribute to existing research that has scrutinised the 
impact of the Eurozone crisis on the growth of Euroscepticism in Greece (Clements et al, 
2014). Furthermore, our findings offer a comparative and empirical substantiation of the view 
that support for leaving the European Union is correlated with lower levels of education – i.e. 
those who are more vulnerable in labour markets (Hobolt, 2016). These findings also 
resonate with existing research focused upon the UK which has revealed that support for 
Brexit was concentrated in geographies and sections of society with high levels of poverty 
and low levels of skills. 
Conclusion 
Although the UK could often be regarded as ‘reluctant Europeans’ (Gowland and Turner, 
2014), the decision by a majority of British voters to leave the EU marks the end to a long 
period of European integration. Such a relationship, initially binding the UK to eight other 
countries, had expanded over five decades to include 27 other states and hundreds of millions 
of people. The European Community, as it was known for many years, progressed by means 
of widening its geo-spatial scope and by a deepening its authority, incrementally increasing 
its decision-making power to the detriment of national governments. All of this stemmed 
from the idea that Europe would benefit from countries pooling their resources and facing 
common risks, and that the European demos would support such a project by developing 
solidarities that span across national boundaries. 
 
What the Brexit vote, along with the electoral success of anti-European parties across Europe, 
tell us about the European project is that the development of the transnational solidarity 
necessary to entrench and accelerate political and economic infra-state solidarity remains, 
after many decades, a largely unlocked potential. This potential has been jeopardized by 
globalization and by the 2008 global financial crisis and its consequences including the 
approach of the EU in addressing the challenges it presented. Moreover, European solidarity 
has been undermined by the reluctance of European leaders to progress towards a more 
integrated Europe.  
 
Our survey of citizens’ positions concerning Brexit across eight countries has revealed that 
there are large sections of the European population that are ready to be lured by the 
arguments deployed in the Leave campaign in the UK (in some countries, including an EU 
founding state France, this section of the population outnumbers those who oppose Brexit) 
and that pro-Brexit individuals are more likely to be found among those who fear Europe for 
its open-border policies, and consider immigrants as a threat to their economic stability and to 
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the integrity of their identity. Paradoxically, what is, for many, the greatest asset of the 
European Union, the free movement of people and transnational connections and 
collaborations, appears to represent to many people its most dangerous and ‘dark side’. That 
among this latter section of populations are those with fewer educational resources and more 
fragile economic positions in the labour market, or those who live in countries suffering from 
economic stagnation, should perhaps sound as a warning to those who believe in the value of 
























Table 1. Percentages of respondents supporting Brexit; percentages of respondents expressing strong attachment to the EU 
 









% of respondents supporting 
Brexit  
41.7 60.1 41.4 59.1 50.6 24.3 67.4 50.6 49.5 
% of respondents with strong 
attachment to the EU 
41.9 53.9 57.6 37.6 53.1 73.7 29.4 45.3 48.7 
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Brexit supporter 11865 0.495 0.500 0 1 
Age 11865 48.900 15.966 18 96 
Female 11865 0.461 0.498 0 1 
Education level  (lower education) 11865 0.312 0.463 0 1 
Unemployed 11865 0.088 0.283 0 1 
Born in UK 11865 0.927 0.259 0 1 
Manual 11865 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Attachment towards  EU 11865 0.487 0.500 0 1 
Support rights inside UK 11865 0.564 0.496 0 1 
Support rights in EU 11865 0.326 0.469 0 1 
Support rights outside EU 11865 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Bad-good effect of foreigners in 
home country (0-10) 11865 4.987 2.845 0 10 
Would mind having immigrants/ 
foreign workers as neighbours 11865 0.312 0.463 0 1 
Left-right scale (0-10) 11865 5.138 2.601 0 10 
Political knowledge 11865 0.532 0.499 0 1 
Political interest 11865 0.747 0.435 0 1 
Unemployment rate (%) 11865 8.821 6.067 4.1 23.5 
GDP growth (%) 11865 1.487 0.842 -0.2 2.9 
 
Table A2: Variable distributions by country 
 
Denmark France Germany Greece Italy Poland Switzerland UK All 
Brexit supporter (%) 41.7 60.1 41.4 59.1 50.6 24.3 67.4 50.6 49.5 
Age  50.5 49.3 49.0 49.0 49.4 47.2 47.7 49.1 48.9 
Female 42.9 45.4 46.9 46.9 48.0 47.8 45.3 45.3 46.1 
Education level  (Lower education) 27.8 32.1 21.5 42.7 48.3 20.6 24.7 33.1 31.2 
Unemployed 7.0 5.4 3.3 24.4 11.8 8.6 6.9 3.7 8.8 
Born in country 94.7 95.8 92.6 92.5 96.9 99.3 81.6 90.3 92.7 
Manual 26.7 16.0 13.6 13.4 15.8 23.7 15.1 20.5 18.0 
Left-right scale 5.1 5.3 4.7 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.3 5.1 
Political knowledge 42.3 41.7 65.2 86.1 56.0 31.3 53.3 46.2 53.2 
Political interest 76.3 70.3 82.8 65.0 71.2 82.8 71.1 77.6 74.7 
Attachment towards  EU 41.9 53.9 57.6 37.6 53.1 73.7 29.4 45.3 48.7 
Support rights inside UK 52.4 52.9 54.0 65.2 52.3 67.6 63.5 43.6 56.4 
Support rights in EU 26.7 28.6 33.2 37.1 36.6 40.1 36.5 21.8 32.6 
Support rights outside EU 39.9 34.4 42.9 36.4 37.1 43.4 48.3 29.6 39.1 
Bad-good effect of foreigners in the economy 5.35 4.5 5.9 3.6 4.7 4.2 5.8 5.6 5.0 
Would mind having immigrants/ foreign workers as neighbours 24.5 39.6 23.9 35.5 35.2 34.6 24.1 34.7 31.2 
Unemployment rate 2016 6.2 10.1 4.1 23.5 11.7 6.2 4.9 4.8 8.8 
GDP growth 2016 2.0 1.2 1.9 -0.2 0.9 2.9 1.4 1.8 1.5 
N 1,498 1,340 1,606 1,507 1,439 1,394 1,591 1,490 11,865 
Notes: All means are reported in percentages with the exception of age, scale of effect of foreigners in the economy of the host country and left-right political 
scale. 
 
Table A3: Variables 
Variable Survey question Coding 
Brexit supporter Should the UK remain a member or leave the EU? 
1=UK should leave the EU 
0=Remain a member of EU  
Age How old are you? Measured in years 
Female Are you male or female? 
1=Female 
0=Male 
Education level  (lower education) Highest education level 
1=Lower education 
0=Intermediate / higher education 
Unemployed What you have been doing for the past 7 days? 
1=Unemployed 
0=Employed, in education, permanently sick, 
retired, housework, military service 
Born in country Were you born in *country*? 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Manual occupation Which option best describes the sort of paid work you do? 
1=Manual 
0=Professional, technical, manager, sales, 
clerical, supervisor, not employed,  
Attachment towards  EU How attached do you feel to the EU? 
1=Very attached / Fairly attached 
0=Not very attached / Not at all attached 
Support rights inside own country 
Have you ever done one of the following to support the rights of 
people/groups in your own country?  
1=Yes, at least one 
0=No 
Support rights in EU 
Have you ever done one of the following to support the rights of 
people/groups in other countries within the EU? 
1=Yes, at least one 
0=No 
Support rights outside EU 
Have you ever done one of the following to support the rights of 
people/groups in countries outside the EU? 
1=Yes, at least one 
0=No 
Effect of foreigners in home country  Effect on the economy that foreigners come to live here Scale from 0 (Bad) to 10 (Good) 
Would mind having immigrants/ 
foreign workers as neighbours 





Left-right scale Left and right in politics Scale from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) 
Political knowledge 
Can you tell who the person in this picture is? (Jean Claude 
Juncker, current President) 
1=Yes 
0=No / Don’t know 
Political interest How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics? 
1=Quite interested / Very interested 
0=Not at all interested / Not very interested 
 
 
Table A4. Multilevel logistic random intercept model of Brexit preferences in eight European countries 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Individual level       
Age  0.054*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age squared  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female  -0.191*** -0.152*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 
  (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Lower education  0.357*** 0.338*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 
  (0.046) (0.047) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Unemployed  0.232*** 0.234*** 0.184** 0.180** 0.183** 
  (0.071) (0.072) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Born in country  0.366*** 0.369*** 0.058 0.057 0.058 
  (0.075) (0.076) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
Manual occupation  0.225*** 0.241*** 0.080 0.081 0.080 
  (0.053) (0.054) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Left-right political scale   0.109*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
   (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political knowledge   0.064 0.158*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 
   (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Political interest   -0.062 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 
   (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Attachment towards EU    -1.762*** -1.762*** -1.762*** 
    (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
Support rights inside UK    0.114** 0.114** 0.114** 
    (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Support rights in EU    0.006 0.005 0.006 
    (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Support rights outside EU     0.065 0.066 0.066 
    (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Effect of foreigners in economy    -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Mind having immigrant     0.290*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 
neighbours    (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) 
Country level       
GDP growth (%)     -0.361**  
     (0.166)  
Unemployment rate (%)       0.013 
      (0.029) 
Constant -0.036 -1.705*** -2.237*** -0.160 0.379 -0.277 
 (0.188) (0.271) (0.276) (0.291) (0.366) (0.388) 
       
Standard deviation of random coef. -0.636** -0.592** -0.602** -0.694*** -0.931*** -0.707*** 
 (0.253) (0.253) (0.253) (0.255) (0.257) (0.255) 
N 11865 11865 11865 11865 11865 11865 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  The age squared term has been added to capture the non-linear effect of age 
on the dependent variable Brexit. Variables have been introduced sequentially as robustness check. 
